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INFORMAL DUE PROCESS
bargaining units separate from those of the rank-and-file workers 34 so
hinder the employer in operating his business and place him at such
disadvantage at the bargaining table that the employees should be de-
nied the right to organize by judicial decree even though the NLRA
has never explicitly denied them that right? The answer to this ques-
tion is at best a matter of opinion. However, it was precisely for decid-
ing this type of question that Congress established a special agency that,
through its constant contact with industry and the problems of interpret-
ing the labor statutes, could develop the expertise needed to resolve
these issues.35 Nevertheless, the Board's response has been rejected
and the responsibility for providing these employees the protection of
the NLRA lies now with Congress.
SHIRLEY J. WELLS
Public Utilities-State Action and Informal Due Process After
Jackson
For nearly a century those who would impose constitutional limita-
tions on ostensibly private conduct have been grappling with the elusive
concept of "state action."' Indeed, the problem of defining state ac-
tion in the troublesome no man's land between purely private and
purely governmental conduct has been called the most important prob-
lem in American law.2 In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.3 -the
United States Supreme Court found the essential state -action require-
ment lacking in a customer's attempt to impose due process limitations
on the termination procedure of a privately owned utility company.4
34. Separate units for guards and professional employees have been authorized
since 1947. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1970).
35. See NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944).
1. In the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) the United States Supreme
Court first propounded the essential dichotomy between state action, which is subject
to constitutional restraints, and "individual invasion of individual rights," which is not.
The distinction for fourteenth amendment purposes is based on the proscription that
"[n]o State shall make or enforce any law. . . ." U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1.
2. See Black, Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection, and California's Propo-
sition 14, 81 HAIv. L. REv. 69 (1967).
3. 95 S. Ct. 449 (1974).
4. Lower courts had been sharply divided in applying the state action doctrine to
utilities which were privately owned, but subject to extensive and detailed regulation by
the state. Compare Palmer v. Columbia Gas, Inc., 479 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1973); Ihrke
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Having resolved this threshold question in favor of the utility, the Court
did not reach further issues pertaining to the nature of the property
right involved, or what due process would require if there were state
action for fourteenth amendment purposes.5
In October 1971 Metropolitan Edison, the sole supplier of elec-
tricity to much of the York, Pennsylvania, area, terminated its service
to Catherine Jackson for alleged non-payment of bills.0 Mrs. Jackson
disputed that her utility account was in arrears, contending that she
never received a bill for the period of the alleged delinquency. Upon
the discontinuance of her electrical service without prior notice, she
filed suit under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act7 seeking reinstate-
ment of her utility service until she had been afforded notice, a hearing,
and an opportunity to pay any amounts found due. She claimed a
statutory right to reasonably continuous electrical service, 8 alleging that
Metropolitan's termination of her service constituted state action de-
priving her of property without due process of law.
In seeking to establish the requisite state action, the petitioner re-
lied upon three major arguments: (1) Metropolitan's actions could
have been attributed to the State because of the State's grant of monop-
oly status to the company;' (2) the state action stemmed from the
v. Northern States Power Co., 459 F.2d 566 (8th Cir.), vacated as moot, 409 U.S. 815
(1972); Bronson v. Consolidated Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), with
Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972) and Kadlec V. Illi-
nois Bell Tel. Co., 407 F.2d 624 (7th Cir. 1969).
5. 95 S. Ct. at 452 n.2.
6. Metropolitan operates pursuant to extensive regulations filed with the Pennsyl-
vania Public Utilities Commission and is the holder of a "certificate of public conveni-
ence" from the Commission. The issuance of such a certificate is a prerequisite for en-
gaging in the utility business in Pennsylvania. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1121(1959). Under its regulations filed with the Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission,
Metropolitan Edison is permitted to discontinue service for nonpayment of bills, upon
reasonable notice to the delinquent customer. See 95 S. Ct. at 451.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides for a civil action for "deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and the laws." The person
causing this deprivation must be acting "under color of any statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, custom, or usage of any State . . . ." This language has been equated by the Su-
preme Court for all practical purposes with the state action standard of the Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). See United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966).
8. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1171 (1959) provides in part: "Every public utility
shall furnish and maintain adequate, efficient, safe and reasonable service and facilities
... . Such service also shall be reasonably continuous and without unreasonable inter-
ruptions or delay."
9. The theoretical basis for this argument is that the state, by its acquiescence
in, if not direct conferral of, monopoly power upon a public utility, greatly increases
the efficacy of the utility's termination procedures. The customer knows that the utility
threatening to terminate his service is his only possible source of electrical power. Like-
wise, the utility has little incentive as a monopolist to cultivate the good will of custo-
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essential nature of the service rendered, giving it the character of a
"public function"; 10 (3) the service termination was state action be-
cause Metropolitan's regulations dealing with termination procedures
were filed with, and approved by, the state regulatory agency.1
The six-member majority found none of these contentions persua-
sive. Analyzing each argument separately,' 2 the Court held that there
was an insufficient relationship between the alleged grant of monopoly
status 13 and the challenged termination to justify labeling that termina-
tion "state action." Taking the narrow view that a "public function"
must be an obligation imposed upon the state by statute,' 4 the majority
rejected the petitioner's second argument on the ground that the Penn-
sylvania statute imposed an obligation to furnish service only on the
mers by eschewing high-handed termination procedures. See Note, State Action: The-
ories for Applying Constitutional Restrictions to Private Activity, 74 COLUM. L. REv.
656, 671 (1974); Note, Fourteenth Amendment Due Process in Terminations of Utility
Service for Nonpayment, 86 HAgv. L. REv. 1477, 1487 (1973); cf. Moose Lodge No.
107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 177 (1972); Lavoie v. Bigwood, 457 F.2d 7, 14-15 (1st Cir.
1972).
10. Private activity has been deemed state action when it involves itself in the
public domain to the extent that it can be considered "quasi-municipal" in nature, thus
giving the public an overriding interest in its regulation. See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S.
296, 301-02 (1966) (privately owned park); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946)
(company town); Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 TExAs L. REv. 347, 378
(1963). Compare Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza,
Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968), with Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
11. See note 6 supra.
12. Justice Douglas, in his dissenting opinion, pointed to the necessity of analyzing
all the relevant factors in their aggregate in a state action determination, rather than
approaching the problem with the idea of finding any single factor that will suffice to
establish state action. See 95 S. CL at 458; Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,
365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
13. The majority assumed arguendo that such a monopoly status had in fact been
conferred by the State. At the same time, it was emphasized that Metropolitan's regu-
lations did not actually contain an outright grant or guarantee of monopoly status, but
rather that the utility business is a natural monopoly, caused by the industry's high fixed
costs and significant economies of scale. See 95 S. Ct. at 454 n.8. The significance
accorded this fact seems to be that even without regulation by the State, Metropolitan
would have been a "natural" monopolist anyway and that therefore a causal relationship
between the State's involvement and Metropolitan's monopolistic behavior was lacking.
This approach overlooks the fact that the State, by regulating rates, removed any possi-
ble incentive to competitors who wished to enter the market despite the high initial in-
vestment, in hope of obtaining high profit margins. See id. at 461-62 (Marshall, J., dis-
senting). More importantly, it overlooks the State's removal of legal barriers to Met-
ropolitan's monopoly status. See Note, 86 HARV. L. REv., supra note 9, at 1489. Ironic-
ally, utilities have succeeded in removing themselves from the prohibitions of the federal
antitrust laws on the ground that they perform state action. See Gas Light Co. v.
Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135, 1138-40 (5th Cir. 1971).
14. See 95 S. Ct. at 454. "If we were dealing with the exercise by Metropolitan
of some power delegated to it by the State which is traditionally associated with sover-
eignty.., our case would be quite a different one." Id.
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licensed utility, not on the state. 15 Finally, the majority adopted a
standard of unprecedented rigidity in disposing of the petitioner's third
contention. State approval of Metropolitan's termination procedure
"where the Commission has not put its own weight on the side of the
proposed practice by ordering it"' 6 did not place the stamp of state ac-
tion on a practice initiated by the private utility, where the role of the
State was initially passive. What the majority innocuously perceived
was a "heavily regulated private utility, enjoying at least a partial mo-
nopoly in the providing of electrical service within its territory. . .that
...elected to terminate service to petitioner in a manner which the
Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission found permissible under state
law.' 7
Much of the case law and literature on the subject of state action
has applied that doctrine to cases in which the challenged activity in-
volved racial discrimination.18  More recently, however, individuals
have been seeking constitutional vindication of an expansive array of
offended "rights" under the rubric of state action. 19 Decisions have
tended to define three broad categories in which the indicia of govern-
ment involvement in private activity have been sufficient to sustain a
finding of "state action. 2 0  These are judicial enforcement of the chal-
lenged activity, 21 "joint participation" by a governmental agency in that
15. That the utility, and not the State, is required by statute to provide electrical
services in no way detracts from the essentially public nature of the service. The State
made a conscious decision to permit private companies, under a regulatory regime im-
posed by the State, to provide utility services. It seems clear that the alternative,
adopted in municipalities across the nation, is for state or local governments to provide
those essential services themselves. See 95 S. Ct. at 464 (Marshall, J., dissenting); 1963
MOODY'S PUBLIC UTILITY MANUAL a86.
16. 95 S. Ct. at 456-57 (emphasis added).
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Evans v. Abney,
396 U.S. 435 (1970); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1947); Wil-
liams, supra note 10.
19. See CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973) (first amendment
challenge against advertising policy of broadcast licensee); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407
U.S. 551 (1972); Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,
391 U.S. 308 (1968) (first amendment challenges against solicitation rules of private
shopping centers); Grafton v. Brooklyn Law School, 478 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1973)
(challenge to law school examination procedure); Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir.
1968) (challenge to private school disciplinary proceedings); cases cited note 4 supra.
20. See generally Note, State Action and the Burger Court, 60 VA. L. REv. 840
(1974).
21. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1947) (judicial enforcement of a racially
restrictive covenant held to constitute "state action"). But cf. Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S.
435 (1970).
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activity,2" and cases in which the state involvement stems from -the es-
sentially public nature of the entity performing the challenged activ-
ity.2  These latter two categories are most pertinent to the public util-
ity case presently under consideration.
In the leading case of Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority2"
the United States Supreme Court held that a privately owned restau-
rant practicing racial discrimination had a sufficiently close relationship
to the State of Delaware to characterize that discrimination as "state
action." The building in which the restaurant was located was owned
by a state agency and public funds were expended for its maintenance.
Most significantly, a state-owned parking garage in the same building
benefited from the presence of the restaurant, and the restaurant ben-
efited from the presence of adjacent parking facilities. The Court held
that "[t]he State has so far insinuated itself into a position of inter-
dependence with Eagle [the restaurant] that it must be recognized as
a joint participant in the challenged activity . . ,25
In Public Utilities Commission v. Pollack 2 6 passengers on a pri-
vately owned, but publicly regulated, bus sytem in Washington, D.C.
alleged that the federal government violated plaintiffs' first and fifth
amendment rights by forcing them to listen to piped-in radio programs
while riding the system's buses. The Supreme Court found "state ac-
tion" present not because of the overall regulatory scheme, but because
in this case the Public Utilities Commission had initiated an investiga-
tion into the radio programs and had affirmatively sanctioned them on
public interest grounds.2 7
In the recent case of CBS v. Democratic National Committee2 8
-the Court was again faced with a pervasive regulatory regime, instituted
by the government as licensor of the public airwaves. CBS, the licen-
see, followed a policy of not accepting editorial advertising. Despite
22. Compare Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Pub-
lic Util. Comm'n v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451 (1952); Lavoie v. Bigwood, 457 F.2d 7 (lst
Cir. 1972); Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968), with CBS v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) and
Grafton v. Brooklyn Law School, 478 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1973).
23. See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501
(1946). Compare Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza,
Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968), vith Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
24. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
25. Id. at 725.
26. 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
27. See id. at 462.
28. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
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the existence of sweeping governmental regulation, the Court declined
to find state action present in the CBS advertising policy, since the rela-
tionship of mutual benefit found to be significant in Burton was miss-
ing, as was the specific endorsement of the licensee's practice that
formed the basis of the Pollack decision. 0
A fourth "joint participant" case deserving of mention is Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis. 0 Moose Lodge involved a claim that the issu-
ance of a liquor license 3' to a racially discriminatory private club by
the State of Pennsylvania constituted a denial of equal protection to
a black person who had been refused service. The Supreme Court
stated that "where the impetus for the discrimination is private, the
State must have 'significantly involved itself with invidious discrimina-
tions' ,32 to warrant a finding of state action. Noting that the state had
not approved, encouraged, or initiated the discrimination, the Court
held that it was insufficiently connected with the specific activity com-
plained of. Again, the elements of the "symbiotic relationship" that
characterized Burton were found lacking.33
Moose Lodge recognized the relevance of the state-imposed mo-
nopoly as a relevant factor in a state action determination, noting that
Pennsylvania limited the number of liquor licenses that it would issue.
Significantly, the Moose Lodge's monopoly was found to be only of lim-
ited effect-hence insufficient to qualify the State as a "joint partici-
pant."31
The second set of state action cases relevant to the public utility
problem are characterized as the "public function" cases. In Marsh
v. Alabama 5 an individual was arrested under a trespass ordinance,
on the streets of a company town, for passing out religious literature
against the wishes of the company's management. Notwithstanding
the private ownership of the town, the United States Supreme Court
found "state action" in contravention of the first amendment, stating,
"the more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use
29. Moreover, the first amendment protection enjoyed by CBS made the Court hes-
itant to set a precedent that could lead to the imposition of a broad range of constitu-
tional obligations on broadcast licensees. See id. at 120-21; text accompanying notes 52-
54 infra.
30. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
31. The state imposed a ceiling on the total number of licenses that would be is-
sued, along with detailed regulations governing the acquisition of a license.
32. 407 U.S. at 173, quoting Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 380 (1967).
33. Id. at 175.
34. See id. at 177; Note, 74 COLUM. L. REV., supra note 9, at 670.
35. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
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by the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed
by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it."3 6
The rationale of Marsh was extended in Amalgamated Food Em-
ployees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc .3  Logan Valley involved
an attempt by the owners of a shopping center to prohibit peaceful
picketing of a business enterprise because it constituted an uncon-
sented to invasion of property rights. Equating a shopping center to
the company town's business district encountered in Marsh, the Su-
preme Court held that the State's trespass laws could not be used to
exclude those wishing to exercise first amendment rights from property
open -to the public. The decision was carefully limited, however, to
instances in which those rights were being exercised "in a manner and
for a purpose generally consonant with the use to which the property
is actually put."':3 8 As in Marsh, a factor weighing heavily with the
Court was the important nature of the constitutional right being re-
stricted, as compared to the apparent lack of any serious deprivation
of privacy or property interests vested in the shopping center's own-
ers.
39
The "balancing of interests" approach suggested in Marsh and
Logan Valley led to a different result, however, in Lloyd Corp. v. Tan-
ner4 -- another case involving a private shopping mall. In Lloyd,
handbillers inside the shopping mall distributed anti-Vietnam War lit-
erature-a task unrelated to the economic business of the mall. The
Supreme Court thus faced the issue it expressly did not address in Lo-
gan Valley. This time the decision fell on the side of private property
rights. Whereas the picketers in Logan Valley had to be near the store
for their picketing to be effective, these handbillers had reasonable al-
ternatives available in distributing their literature; there was no neces-
sity to carry on their activity in the mall. To impose first amendment
constraints on the mall owners would diminish property rights without
significantly enhancing free speech rights.41
If the language in Jackson is taken literally, the case seems to be
36. Id. at 506; accord, Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (segregated park).
The Court in Marsh was also mindful of the preferred position occupied by those wish-
ing to exercise first amendment freedoms, as opposed to the less advantageously posi-
tioned property rights of the owners of the town. See 326 U.S. at 509; text accompany-
ing notes 52-54 infra.
37. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
38. Id. at 319-20.
39. See id. at 324.
40. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
41. See id. at 564-67.
19751 823
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a departure from previous holdings in certain important respects. The
essence of the prior "public function" cases such as Marsh, Lloyd, and
Logan Valley is that a private group may attain a close enough relation-
ship to the public that constitutional interests of members of the public
outweigh the private interests of property owners in restricting the use
of their property.42 Thus a balancing process is at work between com-
peting legitimate interests: a finding of state action may protect con-
stitutionally guaranteed freedoms of speech and religion as in Marsh,
but it also may subject one who is a private property owner to constitu-
tional limitations in the use of his property.4 3
While Jackson is not inconsistent with prior cases in its require-
ment that a private entity exercise powers "traditionally associated with
sovereignty" 44 to perform a "public function," it does formulate new
doctrine by requiring that those privately exercised powers be imposed
upon the state by statute.45 In neither Marsh nor Logan Valley does
it appear that state statutory obligations were being privately performed
-it was sufficient that a private entity was in control of the sole means
of access to a town's business district, either through ownership of the
streets themselves or their functional equivalents-a control clearly as-
sociated with sovereignty. 46  One could easily conclude that a privately
owned utility also provides services "associated with sovereignty,"4
since such services are governmentally provided when they are not pri-
vately supplied under government regulation.48
Furthermore, prior to Jackson, no court analyzing an interrelation-
ship between a regulated or licensed private entity and a state regula-
tory agency had ever implied that, for private action to be attributable
to the state, the state would actually have had to order that action. In
Pollack, it was sufficient that a state agency approved the practice after
42. See Note, 60 VA. L. REV., supra note 20, at 851-54; cf. Williams, supra note
10, at 378.
43. Cf. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973); Lloyd Corp. v. Tan-
ner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Amalga-
mated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
44. See 95 S. L. at 454.
45. Id.
46. But see Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972), where it was found that
there were no overriding public interests in permitting handbilling in a shopping mall
when reasonable alternatives on public property were available.
47. Accord, Palmer v. Columbia Gas, Inc., 479 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1973).
48. In North Carolina, based on the 1960 census, sixteen communities of ten thou-
sand population and over supplied electric utility services municipally, while five pri-
vately owned companies served the rest of the state. 1963 MooDY's PUBLIC UTaLITY
MANUAL a86, a98.
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the fact. Likewise in Burton, the Parking Authority never ordered the
Eagle Restaurant to engage in racial discrimination. The Court in
CBS emphasized that the Federal Communications Commission did not
foster or encourage the challenged conduct, and in Moose Lodge it
spoke in terms of "significant involvement" by the state. Thus, unless
its result is based on unarticulated considerations, Jackson may signify
a substantial retreat from prior state action decisions.
To Justice Marshall, the most troubling aspect of the majority's
opinion was -that, if Metropolitan's termination does not involve state
action for due process purposes, presumably, if the utility decided not
to serve minorities, it also would not involve state action 49-the under-
lying constitutional claims would be irrelevant -to -the state action deter-
mination. Yet it seems almost inconceivable that the Supreme Court
would countenance racial discrimination on the part of a state-regulated
and protected monopoly, dispensing a necessity of modem life.50
There is a strong probability, then, as Justice Marshall himself seemed
to recognize, that unspoken factors lay at the root of the Court's narrow
interpretation of state action in this case.51 State action may be but
a shorthand phrase, obscuring a far more sophisticated analysis than
merely looking for a sufficient quantum of state involvement in what
appears to be private conduct. 52 The underlying question is not
whether there is "state action," but whether there is "state action" that
violates constitutional rights, for counterbalanced against one person's
claim that he has been discriminated against or denied due process is
another person's asserted right to discriminate, or to use his property
as he sees fit.5" In cases discussed previously, the prevailing interests
were freedom of speech and religion in Marsh, freedom of speech in
Logan Valley, property rights in Lloyd (where free speech interests
49. 95 S. Ct. at 465 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Lower courts, however, have expli-
citly recognized that different standards of finding "state action" may apply, depending
on the importance of the alleged deprivation. See, e.g., Grafton v. Brooklyn Law
School, 478 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1973).
50. See Williams, supra note 10, at 365-66.
51. Marshall's dissent on two occasions mentions what some of these unspoken
considerations may be. He cites the value of preserving a private sector of individual
choice, free of constitutional restraints, and the administrative burdens that a due process
requirement could impose on utilities. See 95 S. Ct. at 464. See also Note, 74 CoLUM.
L. REv., supra note 9, at 662; Note, 60 VA. L. Rv., supra note 20.
52. See Note, 60 VA. L. Rav., supra note 20; cf. Black, supra note 2, at 100-03;
Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 487
(1962); Williams, supra note 10, at 389-90. See generally Note, Gilmore v. City of
Montgomery: Is There More to Equal Protection than State Action?, 53 N.C.L. Rav.
-(1975).
53. See Henkin, supra note 52, at 487.
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had other easily attainable outlets), and freedom of the press in CBS.
Property rights of an almost chauvinistically private club prevailed over
an equal protection challenge in Moose Lodge, but not in Burton,
where the property rights of a public restaurant carried far less
weight.
Viewed in this light, Jackson may be less important for its state
action analysis than for its insight into the majority's feelings about the
right to a hearing prior to a discontinuance of utility services for non-
payment.55 It seems unlikely, however, that the Court would have
considered an erroneous termination of electrical service in isolation to
be an insignificant matter. 5 More likely, the Court was also con-
cerned with the administrative difficulties and expense that a large
number of generally unmeritorious disputes could generate for the util-
ities if a hearing were required in each case.57 Moreover, the utilities
find termination notices to be useful bill collecting devices, 8 the effec-
tiveness of which could be weakened by a hearing requirement.
Whether Jackson reflects a concern that erroneous terminations are too
infrequent59 to warrant due process protection or that the procedures
required to prevent them would be too unwieldly, the Supreme Court's
analysis in past state action cases implies that at the foundation of Jack-
son lay an inarticulated premise that the rights of utility customers to
a timely termination hearing are insufficient to override the private
property interests of the public utility owners.
54. See Note, 60 VA. L. REV., supra note 20, at 850.
55. See generally Note, 53 N.C.L. REV., supra note 52.
56. The need for procedural safeguards prior to such a termination is ostensibly
to prevent erroneous terminations. The right of a utility to discontinue service for ac-
tual, undisputed nonpayment has not been challenged. Erroneous or not, however, it
cannot be denied that a utility termination is a serious and potentially dangerous matter.
This was underscored by the deaths of a couple in their nineties in upstate New York
on Christmas Eve, 1973. They froze to death after their heat had been cut off for non-
payment of bills. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1973, at 25 col. 1.
57. Justice Marshall answered this concern by reminding the majority that a full-
scale, formal hearing need not be required to satisfy due process standards, but that ab-
breviated procedures could suffice. See 95 S. Ct. at 464-65 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
58. In 1973 Consolidated Edison (serving the State of New York) delivered about
2.8 million disconnect notices while only about 102,000 residences were actually termi-
nated. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1974, at 20 col. 4. The State Public Service Commis-
sioner was also quoted as saying, "The disconnect notice is an effective collection tool
which is necessary for the financial viability of the utilities." Id.
59. One recent survey indicated that out of a seventeen-city area, serving about 19
million utility customers, there were 310,000 terminations for nonpayment in the space
of one year, or roughly 1.5%. There was no indication, however, how many of these
terminations were discovered to be erroneous. See Comment, The Shutoff of Utility
Services for Nonpayment: A Plight of the Poor, 46 WAsH. L. REv. 745, 777 (1971).
But see note 92 infra.
[Vol. 53826
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Of course, such property interests would not be a factor, nor would
there be a preliminary state action inquiry, if the utility under attack
were municipally owned. There would, however, still be one threshold
question to be answered before the elements of due process could be
considered: whether there is a "property" interest in utility service
protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
UTILITY SERVICE AS A "PROPERTY" INTEREST
Paralleling the recent expansion in the areas to which the state-
action concept has been applied 0 has been an expansion in the range
of liberty and property interests held to be protected by the fourteenth
amendment from deprivation without due process of law. 61 Generally,
the cases have required some sort of vested interest or expectancy in
the alleged right.6 The "interest or expectancy" must be more than
a mere subjective expectancy, however.6 3  It must at least be rooted
in an informal, mutual understanding or agreement, 64 or, if not, in a
formal statute or set of rules.6 5 It is clear that the independent source
of an "interest or expectancy" need not be the Constitution itself. 6
Under these judicially defined tests, there are two avenues by
which utility services may qualify as protected property interests. The
more tenuous of these would be based upon an informal expectancy,
rooted in the essential nature of these services, and the fact that vir-
tually everyone not only receives them, but takes them for granted as
60. See cases cited note 19 supra.
61. See Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975) (public school education); Fusari v.
Steinberg, 95 S. Ct. 533 (1975) (unemployment compensation benefits); Wolff v. Mc-
Donnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) ("good time" sentence reductions); Department of Agri-
culture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973) (food stamps); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S.
593 (1972) (employment in state university system); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1972) (parole revocation); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (driver's license);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare benefits); Thompson v. Washington,
497 F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Burr v. New Rochelle Mun. Housing Authority, 479
F.2d 1165 (2d Cir. 1973) (rent increases). But see Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134
(1974) (federal civil service employment); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564
(1972) (employment in state university system).
62. Compare Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), with Perry v. Sinder-
mann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
63. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 603 (1972).
64. Id. at 601.
65. See Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729, 735 (1975); Thompson v. Washington, 497
F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
66. Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729, 735 (1975); cf. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539 (1974); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471 (1972).
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a modem necessity.67  It may not be necessary, however, to rely on
an informal expectancy if there is a statutory requirement that all util-
ities in a state provide reasonably continous service.6 In this situation,
utility customers apparently would have a property right under state law
that could not be divested without satisfaction of some minimal ele-
ments of due process. 69
While the nature of a property interest is relevant to determining
whether due process applies, the importance of the alleged deprivation
is crucial to the form that due process will take in a particular case.70
The interest of a person in avoiding a property deprivation must be
balanced against the government's interest in summary disposition of
disputed claims .71 Thus, while as a general proposition some form of
prior notice and hearing will be required as long as a deprived property
right is not de minimis, when prompt action is necessary to protect an
important public interest, even substantive rights in private property
can be abrogated summarily.72  Similarly, it would appear that entitle-
ments to property not substantively protected by the due process
clause, but still subject to procedural protection, 73 can be deprived
without prior procedural safeguards if the public interest predomi-
nates. 7
4
It should be emphasized, however, that even when this balancing
process weighs in favor of prior procedural safeguards, it does not nec-
67. "Although such items as a stove, a stereophonic phonograph, a table and a bed
are 'deserving of due process protection,' 'the requirements of due process should be more
embracing' when an absolute necessity of modem life such as electricity is involved."
Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638, 669 (7th Cir. 1972) (en banc)
(Sprecher, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
68. See note 8 supra.
69. In Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729, 735-36 (1975), a state statute providing for
mandatory public school education formed the basis of the Supreme Court's decision,
holding that students could not be suspended from school for a period of ten days or
less without prior procedural safeguards.
70. "[A] weighing process has long been a part of any determination of the form
of hearing required in particular situations by procedural due process." Board of Re-
gents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 (1972).
71. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1972); Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970).
72. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90-92 (1972). Cases where circumstances
have justified summary procedures include: Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339
U.S. 594 (1950) (protect public from misbranded drugs); United States v. Pfitsch, 256
U.S. 547 (1921) (meet needs of war effort); North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. City of
Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908) (contaminated foods).
73. E.g., Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729, 735 (1975) (public education); Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare benefits).
74. Cf. Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729, 740-41 (1975); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S.
134 (1974).
INFORMAL DUE PROCESS
essarily follow that a full evidentiary hearing will be required. *Due
process may be satisfied with very abbreviated procedural safe-
guards. 75  Factors that have influenced the extensiveness of required
prior procedures are the seriousness of the deprivation,76 the length of
the deprivation, 77 the nature and extent of available subsequent pro-
ceedings, 78 and the existence of special interests of the state in abbre-
viated procedures. 79  Irrespective of these factors, however, it is ele-
mentary to any form of due process that there be a timely and adequate
notice of the proposed deprivation and an opportunity to be heard "at
a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."8
In Goldberg v. Kelly8 the Court faced a procedure to terminate
public assistance payments that consisted solely of a post-termination
hearing. No personal appearance by the person to be terminated, no
oral presentation of evidence, and no confrontation of adverse wit-
nesses was required prior to the discontinuance of payments. Crucial
to the Court's decision, finding this procedure inadequate, was a recog-
nition that a welfare termination pending a later resolution may deprive
an eligible welfare recipient of "the very means by which to live while
he waits. 82  The Court noted, however, that a formal trial need not
be provided at the pretermination stage; the hearing would have only
to provide an initial determination of welfare eligibility to protect
against erroneous termination.83 The fatal flaw in the post-termination
procedure was that it failed to provide an opportunity for the welfare
recipient to present oral evidence before an impartial decision-maker,
or to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses prior to the termi-
75. See Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975).
76. See, e.g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (loss of driver's license); Gold-
berg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (loss of welfare benefits); Sniadach v. Family Fin.
Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (garnishment of wages). Compare Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539 (1974), with Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
77. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.,
416 U.S. 600 (1974).
78. See, e.g., Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974). Compare North Ga. Fin-
ishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 95 S. Ct. 719 (1975), with Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.,
416 U.S. 600 (1974).
79. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 561-63 (1974).
80. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972). See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254 (1970); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
"If the right to notice and a hearing is to serve its full purpose, then, it is clear that
it must be granted at a time when the deprivation can still be prevented." Fuentes v.
Shevin, supra at 81.
81. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
82. Id. at 264.
83. Id. at 266-67.
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nation. 4 While no particular order of proof or mode of presenting evi-
dence was required by the Court, the neutral arbiter's decision had to
rest solely on the legal rules and evidence presented at the hearing,
and he was required to state the reasons for his decision, and the evi-
dence relied on.8
At the opposite end of the informal due process spectrum is Goss
v. Lopez, 8 a case involving a ten-day suspension of students from a
public school. Only a post-suspension hearing was provided for by
school procedures. The Supreme Court stated that "the timing and
content of the notice and the nature of the hearing will depend on ap-
propriate accommodation of the competing interests involved. 8s7  In
this case, a mistaken exclusion from the educational process had to be
balanced against the need for discipline in the public schools. Limiting
its opinion to cases involving suspensions of ten days or less, the Court
required that prior to suspension a student be given an oral or written
notice of charges, an explanation of the evidence against him, and a
chance to tell his side of the story. 8 However, this abbreviated "hear-
ing" would follow immediately after the notice, and would, in effect,
be little more than an informal discussion in the principal's office. None
of the formalities of Goldberg were required, in recognition of the
large number of short suspensions and of the administrative burdens
that more formal requirements would impose upon public schools.89
Electrical service is a vital need in today's society to the comfort,
if not livability, of the modem home. Its loss surely can be considered
as serious a deprivation as the loss of one's driver's license,90 or a few
days of public school education, or perhaps even a temporary depri-
vation of welfare benefits. 9 At a very minimum, therefore, an individ-
ual should be afforded an adequate notice prior to termination and an
opportunity personally to dispute any amounts claimed to be due. Us-
ing prior informal due process cases as a guide, standards can be postu-
lated for adequate and meaningful notice and hearing.
84. Id. at 268-271.
85. Id. at 271.
86. 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975).
87. Id. at 738-39.
88. Id. at 740.
89. Cases involving suspensions of longer than ten days would presumably require
more formal proceedings, since the deprivation to the student would be more serious,
Id. at 741.
90. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
91. See Bronson v. Consolidated Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443, 447 (S,D.N.Y.
1972).
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"Adequate" notice must be received sufficiently in advance of a
termination to enable a consumer to forestall such termination by either
paying his bill or notifying the company if it is in error.92 In Goldberg,
the Supreme Court did not find New York's seven-day notice to be in-
sufficient per se, but it intimated that fairness may sometimes dictate
a longer period. 93 Notice must also be more than a bare statement
threatening a termination in a matter of days or weeks if payment is
not made. In addition to reasons for the proposed termination, there
should be a notification that if there is a dispute, recourse may be had
to either company officials or the Public Utility Commission.94
Where the resolution of a disputed claim depends upon findings
of fact, especially with respect to credibility, an opportunity to present
oral evidence is a necessary component of due process.9 5 At a mini-
mum, a pre-termination hearing96 should be designed to establish the
"probable validity"97 of a utility's entitlement to a disputed amount.
Although such a hearing may be informal, cases establish that an im-
partial decision-maker,9 8 such as a member of the State Public Utility
Commission, should be provided, and that the reasons for his determi-
nation, as well as the evidence relied upon, should be specified.99
Goldberg strongly supported a right to confrontation and cross-
92. Utility Company error in terminating service is not insignificant. As many
as 16% of the complaints investigated by the New York Public Service Commission re-
sult in adjustments in favor of the consumer. Id. at 448 n.ll.
93. 397 U.S. at 268.
94. See Palmer v. Columbia Gas, Inc., 479 F.2d 153, 166 (6th Cir. 1973); Bronson
v. Consolidated Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
95. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970); cf. Burr v. New Rochelle
Mun. Housing Authority, 479 F.2d 1165, 1169 (2d Cir. 1973).
96. In Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974), due process was found
not to require a hearing before issuance of a writ of seizure for certain household goods.
That case is distinguishable from Jackson, however, in that the same statute that author-
ized the issuance of the writ also mandated a timely hearing subsequent to the seizure.
Thus the length of time of a potentially erroneous property deprivation was greatly lim-
ited. See text accompanying notes 76-79 supra. In contrast, the applicable statute in
Jackson gives the Public Utilities Commission complete discretion in refusing to grant
a hearing if, in the Commission's opinion, it would not be in the public interest. See
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1393 (1959). Jackson is further distinguishable in that it in-
volved an extremely serious property deprivation, while Mitchell involved the deprivation
of such arguably non-essential items as a stereo and a refrigerator. Compare Mitchell
v. W.T. Grant Co., supra, with North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 95 S. Ct.
719 (1975).
97. See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 609 (1974); Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 485 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 540 (1971); Sniadach
v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 343 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring).
98. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970); cf. Fusari v. Steinberg, 95
S. Ct. 533, 538 (1975).
99. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970).
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examination in the welfare context, but a more recent case casts some
doubt on the indispensability of that requirement. In Fusari v. Stein-
berg'00 the Court remanded a case partly for consideration of whether
a requirement that examiners base their decisions on eligibility for un-
employment compensation benefits only on evidence submitted in per-
son or in writing might ameliorate the absence of a confrontation re-
quirement.' 0' Perhaps an accommodation can be reached whereby a
confrontation requirement would be imposed in cases where, for ex-
ample, credibility is an important issue to be determined.
CONCLUSION
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison casts serious doubt on whether
constitutional proscriptions are likely to be imposed on privately owned
utility companies in the near future. Apparently the Court felt that
the need to preserve private decision-making in the use of one's prop-
erty was a worthier consideration in the private utility context than pro-
viding a customer with a hearing prior to a service termination. The
Supreme Court has yet to rule on a similar case involving a govern-
mentally owned utility, but prior, analogous cases strongly suggest that
the almost universal necessity of electricity and the hardships that its
deprivation would cause would carry the day for some informal prior
procedures to prevent the erroneous termination that one court has
termed an "Orwellian nightmare of computer control."'10 2
RAYMOND M. BERNSTEIN
100. 95 S. Ct. 533 (1975).
101. Id. at 538.
102. See Bronson v. Consolidated Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443, 444 (S.D.N.Y.
1972).
[Vol. 53
